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I. INTRODUCTION

Phillip Shaver and his co-authors succinctly encapsulate
contemporary psychological theory on interpersonal attachmentprimarily parent-child attachment and its role in creating lifelong
attachment patterns-and seek to outline the relevance of such research
for both social policy and law. They direct our attention to three areas:
adult relationship conflict, including both domestic violence and divorce;
criminal behavior, particularly among juveniles: and foster care, with a
special emphasis on removal of the children of incarcerated mothers.
In each of these areas the proposed diagnosis is essentially the same:
insecure attachment patterns, both avoidant and anxious, are associated
with dysfunctional coping patterns and negative behaviors, toward
intimates (as in domestic violence), others (as in criminal or anti-social
behavior), or the self (as in substance abuse). Thus, Shaver et aL assert
that insecure attachment patterns are an under-recognized cause of legalsystem involvement.' More, they imply that legal system can influence
* Assistant Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to the
organizers of this Syxnposium and to Joanna Grossman.
See Phillip R. Shaver et al., What s Love Got to Do with It? Insecuri' and

Angr in Attachment Relationships, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 491 (2009)

(manuscript at 2q. on file with author). It is vorth noting Shaver et al.'s causal
language. I do not understand them to be asserting that insecure attachment
patterns are the sole (or even the primary) cause of the negative outcomes they
describe. See. eg. id. (manuscript at 5) (citing longitudinal studies showing that
lack of a "safe haven" or "secure base" is correlatedwith poor outcomes); id.
(manuscript at 10) (citing "association" between avoidant attachment and anger
suppression among males with history of violence). They do, however. appear
to be arguing something well beyond simple correlation. See. e.g.. id.
(manuscript at 9) (asserting that insecure attachment patterns "contribute to
relationship conflict and sometimes lead to domestic violence"), id. (manuscript
at 24) (and are "responsible for- drug and alcohol abuse). Arguing for a causal
contribution. even a small one, for insecure attachment is not uncontroversial.
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the development of secure or insecure attachment patterns among those
such as minor children whose parents are in conflict,
properly before it,
unavailable, or unfit.
Also constant across these domains is the cure they preach:
attachment-oriented treatment plans.- When seeking to help abused
persons stay out of destructive relationships, their review suggests, we
ought to understand that anxious attachment patterns pose a particular
challenge for some and warrant direct attention. So too with hostile
former spouses working toward viable child support and custody
arrangements, incarcerated persons addicted to alcohol and drugs.
children removed from incarcerated parents, juveniles placed in
detention, and foster parents struggling to provide adequate support for
the children they take in. If in those situations we could identif\ the
impact of insecure attachment patterns and better tailor treatment plans
to reshape such patterns, they urge, wve might have a positive impact on
the affected persons' future relationships, anti-social behaviors, and
capacity for healthy self-care.
It's a compelling case and an ambitious program. It is also relatively
clear how the diagnosis and prescription could shape social policy. Many
of the hopeful examples to which Shaver et al. point3 implicate social
wxelfare spending, encouraging public and private investment in,for
example, comprehensive counseling programs for perpetrators and
victims of domestic violence, as well as in meaningful therapeutic
interventions within prisons, jails, and juvenile detention facilities. They
also counsel more thoughtful programmatic choices within social service
provision-for example, designing the screening and training of foster
parents so as to better enable them to provide healthy attachment
opportunities for children. Such spending and programming choices are
obviously enormously important. It is not immediately clear from Shaver
et al.'s account, though, how their attachment perspective might shape
law, including /amilv law, beyond shaping the content of the counseling-

and-family-support elements that often are packaged into familv-law
outcomes and that may sometimes accompany incarceration.
In this Comment I explore the possible legal implications of
attachment theory, with a focus on the specific family law domains
See, e.g.. Everett \V\aters & Donna M. Noyes, Psvchological Paretinzg Vs.
Attachment TheorT: The Childs Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right
Things/br the Vron g Reasons, 12 N.Y.U. REx'. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505. 510-12
(1983-84).
See Shax er et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 24-25, 27, 28, 30).
See id. (manuscript at 19) (parenting workshops): id. (manuscript at 27)
("attachment-focused interventions" with "high-risk parents"): id. (manuscript
at 280 ("'Attachment and Biobehavioral Catch-up' intervention program[s]").
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discussed by Shaver et al. I show that many areas of fanilv lawparticularly the legal friamework for foster care, adoption, and postdivorce custody of minor children---already seek to cultivate and reward
attachment. But attachment is not and cannot be the sole-or even.
perhaps. the most important-factor driving most legal determinations.
Recognizing the importance of secure attachment does not answer
difficult questions about how best to achieve it, particularly within the
context of competing claims. Infilct, taking an attachment perspective in
isolation might lead to normatively bad outcomes. However, there are
instances in which an attachment focus should be legally determinative,
for it may sometimes illuminate outcomes that are all upside and no
downside. The Comment concludes by offering some thoughts about
law-relevant social policy implications.
11. ATI..CimIlN I AND FAMILY L..\V: A STARTING POINT, NOT \N ANSWER
A child's attachment---or lack of attachment-to significant adults in
her life has long been recognied as an important factor in legal
determinations as to establishment of parental rights, post-divorce
custody and visitation, foster care. adoption, and the rights of nonparents to maintain contact with children.
To be sure, lecal decision-makers generally haxe not undertaken to
distinguish between ditferent types of insecure attachment, nor have they
used the psychoanaly tically-based language popularized by Bowlbv. But
though their rhetoric does not map precisely onto that of psychologists, it
maps rather closely. As legislatures and courts have moved past the
property-law concepts that once dominated the legal treatment of
children 4 the\ have spoken in broader terms about emotional bonds,
attachments, and consistency of care and support. The Supreme Court
has, for example, cited with approval the states' desire to preserve a
child's "'fanilv ties whenever possible," 5 relied heavily on the impact of
substantive adult-child "relationships,"'
aid acknowledged the
importance of "emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of

cc Robert J. Lcxy. Lusto," Lai and the-.Li, Principles:.4Little Histo"y, a
Little Polic, " and Some i,v Tentative .Iud,.,mns. in RECONCFIVIN6 THE

4

F\ULY: CRITIQUFON IrHFA
..\1RICAN L.\\\ INSTItrt.:F'S PRINCIPLU:S OF THE LAw
o FAMILY DIssotU LIoN (7. o8 & n.6 (Robin FretvelIl \Wilson ed.. 200o) (citing
HOMER H. CLARK, 2 LAW OF DomxlFSTic RFL.\rIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 496

(2d ed. I Q8),

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 4s. 152 (1072) (quoting 11.
Re\. Stat., c.17, §
701-2).
"Caban \.Mohanimed. 441 U.S. 380. 3Q7 (1979) (stating that "'[plarental fights
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child. They require relationships more enduring.") (Stewart. J. dissenting).
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daily association.",7 Such adult-child emotional bonds are valued not in
the abstract, but because they are thought necessary to the healthy
psychological development of children. 8 These concepts track the core
concepts of attachment theory.
If the role of healthy adult-child attachment historically was largely
implicit in family law, particularly its child welfare aspect, its
importance came into much sharper focus following the 1973
publication of the influential (if sometimes controversial) Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child.9 That volume introduced the concept of the
"psychological parent," defined as an adult who "on a continuing, dayto-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and
mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as
the child's physical needs."' 10 A psychological parent is, in other words, a
secure attachment figure." Several features of the psychological
parenting theory articulated in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child are
noteworthy. First, its authors-Goldstein, Solnit, and Freud-detailed
the concomitants of healthy adult-child attachment more extensively
than had prior efforts within the legal literature. Second, they proposed
that such attachment was possible with any person sufficiently present
for and invested in the child's life-not just a biological parent, and
certainly not just the mother. Third, they positioned protection of a
child's attachments as not just an important factor but the most important
factor in legal determinations. Finally, they tied their theory to a detailed
set of specific legislative recommendations, a number of which would
have worked a substantial change in the family law of most states. It is
difficult to overstate the influence of these ideas over the last thirty
years. They "have had an impact on the law governing child welfare
decisions that would exceed any academicians' wildest expectations,"
and "every subsequent proposal for reform of the child welfare system

7 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977).
8 See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 286 (1976) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[s]ecurity, continuity and 'long-term stability' . in
an on-going custodial relationship . . . are vital to the successful personality
development of a child").
9 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

(1973).
'°Id. at98.
See Shaver et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 4) (primary caregivers are
referred to as attachment figures in attachment theory). But see GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 19-20 (acknowledging that children can have strong
emotional attachments to unhealthy adults and still "progress emotionally within
this relationship").
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has drawn its vocabulary and central
ideas" 12 from Beyond the Best
13
Interest of the Child and its sequel.
Thus, the notion that child welfare determinations should be madeat least in part-on the basis of protecting and encouraging secure
attachment relationships between children and the important adults in
their lives has been both firmly ensconced and specifically articulated in
our law for some time. This focus unquestionably has been strengthened
in recent decades, but the post-1973 shift has been one primarily of
degree rather than of kind. 14 Healthy attachment is now better
understood by legal decision-makers, it is more thoroughly explained in
legal dispositions, and its legal status has been elevated.
However, a clear commitment to the notion that consistent,
emotionally supportive adult-child bonds are to be sought and respected
has not resulted in stable doctrine. Legal decision-makers can take quite
different views of the persons or types of persons with whom children
are likely to have such bonds; the family-care arrangements most likely
to encourage such bonds; and the degree to which those bonds may
influence the adult's legal status vis-d-vis the child. To grant an
important role to attachment gives little guidance on how to weigh it
against important rights with which it may be in tension. Further, the
extent to which law should inquire into the existence and quality of
adult-child attachments may differ dramatically depending on the legal
posture.
First, family law is bedeviled by issues of competing attachments.
Consider cases in which biological fathers have sought parental rights to
children born outside of a marriage relationship with the mother. The
Supreme Court has declined to hold that the biological bond is irrelevant,
12

Nadine Taub, Assessing the Impact of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnits

Proposals:An Introductory Overview, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 485,
485 (1983-84) (citing for the latter proposition Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate
ParentalRights? 35 STAN. L. REv. 423, 446-47 (1983)). See, e.g., Guardianship
of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (adopting concept
of psychological parenthood despite claim that it relied "on such nebulous
factors as 'love and affection"'; "[o]ur law recognizes that children generally
will sustain serious emotional harm when deprived of the emotional benefits
flowing from a true parent-child relationship" characterized by "bonding and
attachment").
13
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

S4The

(1979).

focus on children's emotional lives arose in the early 20th century as part
of the same social reform movement leading to establishment of a separate
juvenile justice system to identify and "cure" delinquency. See, e.g., Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhoodand Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Casefor Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991) (detailing

the rise of the child-saving Progressive movement).

Iliginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 16:2

but has evinced a strong inclination to prioritize only those genetic
fathers who have undertaken to create an ongoing, substantial, and
supportive relationship with their children.1 5 But acknowledging that an
attachment relationship means something does not determine "the
relative weight to be accorded biologcal ties and psychological ties."' L'
Most problematically, the biological father's attachment with the childeven if proven-can come into conflict with attachment claims of
perhaps equal or greater import in the child's life, as where the child is7
living wNith another father figure to whom attachments have formed.'
Thus, father-child attachment is necessary but not sufficient for
attainment of parental status, and the sufficiency of other considerations
(including other adult-child attachments) cannot be determined solely by
reference to attachment theory.
The difficult issue of competing attachments has also shaped the law
of foster care. In the now-classic case of Smith v OFFER. the Supreme
Court was asked to determine the legal relevance of children's
attachments to foster parents."" In that case, foster parents sought greater
recognition of their relationships with children in their care by seeking to
force the state to follow more stringent procedures before removing
those children from foster homes, and to justify any such removal. Given
the reality that foster children "often develop deep emotional ties with
their foster parents," ought foster parents have the right to protest their

15 See Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 256. 259-60 (1983) (extolling the
"intangible fibers that connect parent and child" and noting Court's "distinction
between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental
responsibility"); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380. 392-94 (1979) (construing
N.Y. Domestic Relations Law): Quilloin v. \Walcott- 434 U.S. 246. 256 (1Q78)
(construing Georgia law): Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 654-55 (1972)
(construing Illinois law).
'° Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 n.18.
'A It. at 262, 263 n.19 (like Quilloin. this case involved biological father's
objection to adoption of child by mother's new husband, with whom the child
lived as part of "a family unit already in existence"). See also Mlichael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (rejecting idea that "a liberty interest is
created by biological fatherhood plus an established parental relationship" in
context implicating "the historic respect" accorded to "relationships that
develop within the unitary fanaily"). The point is not that the Court's decisions
in the cases are normatively correct, but that valuing secure attachment does not
(and cannot) on its own resolve such cases.
s 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents' challenge to adequacy of New York's
pre-removal procedures). For a comprehensive account of the case, including an
assessment of its effects, see David L. Chambers & Michael S. \Vald, Smith :
OFFER, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY.
PUBLIC POICY 67 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1996).

LAW REFORM. AND
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removal and thus preserve the relationship, and what weight should be
given to the length of the foster placement?' 9
Attachment theory provided an important starting point for the
Court's analysis. Adopting the "psychological parent" theory, the Court
declared that no one
would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child
in his or her care may exist even in the absence of a
blood relationship. .

.

. [I]t is natural that the foster

family should hold the same place in the emotional life
of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing
20
functions, as a natural family.

But consensus on that starting point did not produce unanimity, nor
did it result in a holding entirely in favor of the foster parents. The fact
that they may have become secure attachment figures for the child does
not exist in a vacuum; as the Court noted, the relationship is intended to
be temporary, and one should not be able to acquire emotional
"squatter's rights in another's child., 21 Prior to Smith v. OFFER some
state courts had gone so far as to hold that a foster parent's creation of an
attachment relationship was actually a basis to terminate the placement,
as such attachments are bound eventually to be ruptured and may
"hinder the child's ultimate adjustment in a permanent home. ' 22 The
Smith v. OFFER Court (rightly) refused to go that far, but the inherent
tension in the enterprise-how to provide foster children with just
enough attachment to serve the temporary purposes of foster care and
still position the child for a return to old attachments (with the original
caregivers) or development of new, permanent ones?-led it to defer
heavily to the state's choices.
There simply is no easy way out of this predicament. Call it wrong
in one direction by giving no respect to foster attachments, and children
are subjected to both a rupture from the parent and a tentative and
emotionally unfulfilling relationship with a detached temporary
caretaker-perhaps a series of them-which virtually guarantees severe
attachment issues. Call it wrong in the other, and parents who have
become both available and fit will be unable to reclaim their children
"9Smith, 431 U.S. at 836.
Id. at 844.

20
21
22

Id. at 847 n.54 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, supra note 8, at 552 n.2).
Id. at 862 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing approvingly to In re Jewish Child

Care Ass'n (Sanders), 5 N.Y. 2d 222 (1959)); see also 431 U.S. at 836 n.40

(pointing to that and similar cases as examples of the "intrinsic ambiguity of
foster care").
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because the system is unwilling to disrupt what has matured into a fullfledged attachment with the foster parent.
A similar balancing act perennially plagues adoption law. The
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, for instance, was motivated in
large part by the idea that children's attachment needs were being
harmed by an undue focus on and unsuccessful attempts toward
biological family reunification. 23 But the Act has been criticized by some
children's advocates for-to name just one such complaintinadequately prioritizing genuine reunification efforts that could
preserve adequate attachment relationships.2 4 Recognizing the primacy
of secure attachment reveals the tension; it does not resolve it.
Second, questions of decision-making allocation as between parent
and state also may come into conflict with attachment concerns. The
25
recent high-profile "grandparent visitation" case, Troxel v. Granville,
makes that clear. At common law, non-parents had no right to compel
visitation with minor children to whom they were emotionally attached.
In recognition of the important and supportive role that grandparents can
play in children's lives, many states in the 1980's and 1990's passed
legislation to alter that rule and gave grandparents a right to seek
visitation. 26 In upholding one such law in Washington State, the Troxel
trial judge cited with approval that the grandparents in question were
part of a "large, loving family" and reflected nostalgically on the
nurturing he had received from his own grandparents as a child. 27 The
Supreme Court reversed. While acknowledging that in "an ideal world,
parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents
and their grandchildren," the Court held that parents, not the state,
should make the judgment as to whether, how, and when those
attachments would be created and maintained.2 8 Justice Kennedy, in
dissent, made an impassioned plea for protecting those attachments
through legal coercion. He cited to the foster-care and parental-identity
cases for the principle that "persons who have a strong attachment to the
Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
Martin Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is
the Problem that Too Many ChildrenAre Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care
or that Too Many ChildrenAre Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141
(1999).
25 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000).
26 Some such laws concerned only limited situations, such as those in which the
23
24

grandparents' child was deceased and the surviving parent sought to prevent
ongoing contact between the grandchildren and her former in-laws; some
reached more broadly. Moreover, some laws (such as the one at issue in Troxel)
gave petition rights to persons other than grandparents. See WASH. REV. CODE §
26.10.160(3) (1994).
27 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
28 Id.
at 70.
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child" and "the concomitant motivation to act in a responsible way to
ensure the child's welfare" ought sometimes to be allowed to petition for
visitation, as "where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a
third person, arbitrarily depriving the child' 29of the relationship could
cause severe psychological harm to the child. ,
The existence of this debate shows the limits of the attachment
perspective. All sides agreed that it is better for children to enjoy the
consistent, competent support of loving adults such as grandparents. To
this degree, the attachment perspective is useful; it provides common
ground and identifies shared values. But whether the state or parent
should be the gatekeeper to such attachments is a different question. The
majority would leave that decision to a presumptively fit parent in all
instances. They would do so not because of a judgment that parents are
best positioned to know which other adults are secure attachment
figures; their authority to curtail contact, based in parental autonomy,
includes the right to cut off competent, loving adults and thus harm their
children's attachments. In contrast, certain of the dissenters (including
Kennedy) would allow the state to weigh in when a judge determines
that the non-parent plays an important and healthy role. If one thinks the
encouragement of adult-child attachment to be the paramount goal, the
latter approach is clearly preferable. However, few would dispute that
parental autonomy is due some significant consideration. Such issues
cannot be answered solely by appeal to empiricism about attachment.3 °
Third, the proper methods of promoting attachment are subject to
legitimate debate. The law of post-divorce custody and visitation, which
has at different points in time adopted very different tactics, illustrates
this well. Historically, resolution of custody disputes between oppositesex biological parents reflected rigid ex ante judgments as to which
parent was most likely to be a source of secure attachment. 31 Most states
deemed the mother the presumptive primary caregiver,32 to whom
Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d
21, 30 (Wash. 1998) in part).
29

See generally Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: ParentalRights After Troxel
v. Granville, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 279.
31 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting)
30

("[A] State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common human
experience, that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an
infant creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting
from the male's often casual encounter."). Of course, the law also reflected rigid
ideas about the nature of family, as reflected in laws severely disadvantaging
children bom out of wedlock. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
32 Attachment theory equates "primary caregiver" with attachment figure.
Shaver et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 4).
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physical custody therefore would be given. Such laws also reflected
strong ideas about the time frame within which the statutorily-privileged
attachment was most important, as seen in the once-ubiquitous "tender
years" presumption. 34 The underlying notion was not just that biological
mothers were in fact the primary attachment figures but that, as a childdevelopment matter, they should be. 35 With societal shifts in various
attitudes about families, including the role of fathers, these categorical
rules eventually gave way to the now well-known "best interest of the
child" standard. 36 Though much criticized-primarily
for its
indeterminacy and the ease with which it lends itself to state
overreaching 37-the "best interest of the child" standard theoretically
allowed custody decisions to be made on the basis of individualized
consideration of the availability, track record, and nurturing qualities of
competing potential caregivers.
"Best interest of the child" has not been the final word, however; the
proper way to cultivate and reward secure attachment after a break in the
parents' relationship remains subject to debate. Joint custody
arrangements came into vogue in part on the theory that they would best
facilitate healthy attachment with both parents. 38 Courts also have
experimented with awarding primary custody to the parent judged most
See Levy, supra note 4, at 68 & nn.7-10.
See id. Query, though, whether certain of Shaver et al.'s research suggests the
legitimacy of the tender years presumption. If it is true that attachment patterns
are observable at twelve to eighteen months and "tend to persist," we would
want to particularly prioritize secure attachment during that period. Shaver et
al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 5). However, we would still need to know more
about whether attachment during early infancy needs to be with a mother figure,
and to what extent unhealthy patterns necessarily "persist" or can be
significantly altered later in childhood (or life) by specific interventions (as
Shaver et al. appear strongly to suggest).
35 Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REv. 615, 630-33 & n.47 (1992); see also Everett Waters & Donna M.
Noyes, Psychological Parenting v. Attachment Theory: The Childs Best
Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Thing for the Wrong Reasons, 12
33
34

N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.

CHANGE

505, 508-510 (1983-84). Sometimes referred to

by the misleadingly broad label "attachment theory," this legal regime presumed
that children had only one primary attachment relationship, that with the mother.
In later years the concept of multiple attachments became more popular.
36 See, e.g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act § 402 (amended 1973).
37 See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, The Political and Legal Implications
of the
PsychologicalParentingTheory, 12 N.Y.U.

REV. L.

&

SOC. CHANGE

545, 549-

53 (1983-84).
38 See Levy, supra note 4, at 69 & nn.14-17 (asserting the theory, which has
been disputed, that "if divorced fathers are not deprived of authority over their
children they will continue to support them and stay emotionally attached to
them, to the child's developmental advantage").
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likely to allow the child's continued relationship with the other parent, a
strateg-- referred to as the "friendly parent" rule-that might maximize
attachment opportunitics.- 9 Another theory-the "approximation
standard"--has now acquired a significant following. First urged by
Elizabeth Scott in 1992, "approximation- seeks to conform post-divorce
parenting to prc-divorce patterns. 4 0 Rather than presume attachment
patterns based on a parent's gender or enforce an ideal of the child's
equal attachment to both parents, this approach "seeks to gauge the
strength of existing bonds and to perpetuate them through the custody
arrangement. -4 Emotional continuity, it is thought, is best attained by
literall, continuing the emotional in estment patterns to which the child
is accustomed. This approach has been adopted by the American Law
Institute in its Principles of the Law of Fatnil. Dissolution 4 - as well as
by certain states.4 3
Every single one of the above variants of custody law has been
justified by recourse to attachment theory. Thus, there is wxidespread
agreement over the benefits of parent-child attachment, but legitimate
debate oxcr how best to achieve it. Indeed, Shaver et al. point to
evidence suggesting that no particular legal scheme for post-divorce
custody is necessarily tied to better attachment outcomes. If "good
parenting," particularly by mothers, moderates the association between
divorce and attachment problems for the children, and if "'dysfunctional
tanilvy dynamics" rather than the divorce itself account for the
differences,4 4 then perhaps any custodial arrangement is fine if executed
by parents who know how to foster secure attachment patterns. and no
custodial arrangement can make up for parents who don't. If this is so.
perhaps we are better off focusing our energy on direct intervention to
improx e parenting skills somlething that is best achieved through
policy. education, and counseling initiatives-rather than mandating
particular custodial schemes.
To sum up thus far: secure adult-child attachments are vital to
healthy child development, a fiat the modern lax of parental rights.
custody and visitation, foster care. and adoption seeks to acknowledge
and reflect. Encouraging and rewarding such attachments is a worthx
Sec i0. at 71--4 (describing the "friendly parent" rule).
Scott.Isupra note 35. at 617-43 (1O2).
41 la. at o'2: scc also Lc\"y,. .q
note 4. at 74-7S.
42 Axi. L.-k\\ INST., PRINCIPLFS OF THE L.AWv OF F.xIILx DISSOLUTIO: AN\ALYSIS
AM) RFCO1Fnt \riONS 180-248 (2002). See also Katherine T. Bartlett. U.S.
Custod" Law and Trc"d in the ConteXt ot the ALl Principlhs on the Law o/
Farnih"Dissolution, 10 \V-. J. SoC. POL" & L. 5. 35-41 (2002).
Se, e.,,.. W.VA. CODE § 4S-9-20o (2008) ("Allocation of custodial
responsibility").
4 Sha\ r et al., supra note I (nr,muscript at _t0-2_).
3,)
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goal, and to the extent that family law now elevates it above the
property-rights concepts of the past, the law has improved. But valuing
attachment provides no obvious answers to how such attachments are
best achieved, does not resolve tensions among competing interests, and
does not clearly indicate when law-as opposed to social policy,
education, or psychoanalysis--ought to accommodate that value.
III. THE VALUE OF ATTACHMENT THEORY FOR FAMILY LAW

But perhaps this encapsulation gives attachment theory unduly short
shrift. It may be possible to isolate instances in which a strong
commitment to attachment theory ought to tip the legal balance in a
particular direction. There are, indeed, situations in which focusing on
children's attachments is lopsidedly positive, and it is in those situations
that the insights are most usefully invoked.
First, though, one could challenge the assertion that the dilemmas
posed in the previous section demonstrate the limits of attachment
theory's utility for law. It may be the case not that an attachment focus is
inadequate to answer the tough questions but, rather, that legal decisionmakers have been unwilling to give attachment its due. Tepid
commitment to the principle could be the source of the perceived
tension. This arguably was the position taken by Goldstein, Solnit, and
Freud, who believed that a proper understanding of psychological
parenthood necessarily drove specific child-welfare reforms. They urged
us to wholly embrace the child's perspective, to look at the available
options through the lens of the child's emotional life and to use the
child's accelerated concept of time, not that of adults or the notoriously
slow legal system-and they promised that if we did, we would
understand how our child welfare law needed to change.4 5 Perhaps, then,
we should resolve all these thorny legal issues by measuring which of all
possible outcomes is most likely to provide the child with the greatest
number of fully secure attachment relationships in her life.
But this goes too far. Fostering secure attachments cannot serve as a
sole (or primary) justification for state intervention-such as removing a
child from the home or subjecting the family to state supervision. Parents
may be anxious or avoidant ones and may inculcate those patterns in
their children, but this does not render them unfit.46 Though child
supra note 9, at 31-52.
46 This observation is relevant to Shaver et al.'s concern about entrusting
children of incarcerated women to the kinship care of their grandmothers, as
those grandmothers may have been responsible for the mothers' attachment
issues and will have the same effect on the grandchildren. See Shaver et al.,
supra note 1 (manuscript at 27). Even assuming (likely counterfactually, in my
view) that all incarcerated women with children have significant attachment
45 See

GOLDSTEIN,
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welfare law should protect children from privation-environments in
which they have no opportunity to form any minimally acceptable
attachment-to further police the psychological relationship between
parent and child is a step we may implement only through non-coercive
means. The pull toward intervention is harder to resist if we start
measuring parenting not by the dichotomous fit/unfit classification but
by a continuum concept of attachment. It is easy enough to state that
within the universe of fit parents there are those whose attachments with
their children are sufficiently insecure as to create future psychological
difficulties, perhaps even severe ones, but that the individual and social
harm of removing children from those imperfect families outweighs any
benefit. Unfortunately, this premise is stronger in theory than in practice.
Attachment has been invoked to justify state intervention in essentially
fit, if profoundly imperfect, families.4 7 We do a poor job of internalizing
the concept of "good enough" where child welfare is concerned; and
particularly where enticing alternatives-such as psychologically betteradjusted alternative caregivers--dangle nearby, we can lose sight of the
broader principle.
The issue is, however, potentially quite different where attachment is
used not to justify otherwise questionable state intervention but to
inform the treatment of persons already properly subject to state power.
Where divorcing parents seek a judicial determination of custody and
support, where children are legitimately in foster care and must be cared
for, returned to their parents, or freed for adoption, or where adults seek
issues, and assuming (perhaps counterfactually) that those issues were caused
by the grandmothers, it is not obvious why this would lead to a legal concern
about kinship placement; the children are going to learn poor attachment
patterns from either mother or grandmother. If the mother is minimally fit, it is
preferable for her to continue caring for the child-not because the grandmother
(like her) is going to inculcate insecure attachment, but because the additional
stress of separation from the mother is additionally harmful to the child. Thus,
Shaver et al. are correct that their concerns lean in the direction of avoiding
maternal incarceration. But if the mother is not minimally fit or the offense is
too serious for her to escape incarceration, and if prisons do not radically reform
their potential for in-house childcare, the child must be placed with someone;
and a kinship placement with a fit grandparent is more likely than a stranger
placement to preserve some existing attachment, even if its patterns reflect
anxiety or avoidance.
47 Guggenheim, supra note 37, at 551 (arguing that courts have "seized upon the
psychological parenting phenomenon" as an easy solution, with the result that
"a politically neutral theory about human behavior works untold harm in actual
practice"). Goldstein et al. have defended themselves against charges that their
view weakens commitment to family non-intervention, as they explicitly stated
that preservation of existing families was paramount. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9,
at 7-8; Interview with Joseph Goldstein, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575,
575 (1983-84).
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a legal status commensurate with their emotional role, perhaps law
should promote and reward secure attachment above all other interests.
This, too, likely goes too far, for-as the previous section
demonstrated--other important interests often are at stake. Even
jurisdictions using the "approximation" approach to custody contain an
exception for situations in which "the child would be harmed because of
a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachments between
each parent and the child., 48 In the foster care and adoption contexts a
myopic focus on attachment favors a competent immediate caregiver,
especially where the separation from an earlier caregiver has been
prolonged and even where the initial separation was unfair or
unavoidable. This is particularly so if the original attachment figure is
just good enough, while the new one is very good indeed. 4 9 Attachment
simply cannot be the trump card.
But where a child's welfare or a family's fate already properly is
subject to legal regulation, there are some instances in which a focus on
healthy attachments generates significant benefits without a downside,
and in those instances law should strongly reflect attachment theory.
Courts and legislatures should not, for example, dismiss legitimate
attachment concerns in favor of rigid, status-based, and discriminatory
judgments. One historical example is now-invalidated statutes divesting
unmarried fathers of any parental rights, no matter their relationship with
their children. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court invalidated 50a
state law excluding unmarried fathers from the definition of "parent.
The result of that law was that a biological father who had functioned as
a parent and formed attachments with his children was barred from
retaining custody after their mother died; they became wards of the
state. 51 As the Court correctly determined in that case, it is illogical to
disrupt legitimate attachment relationships because of adherence to a
particular, rigid view of unmarried fathers.5 2

W.VA. CODE § 48-9-206(a)(4) (2008).
49 See Bennett v. Marrow, 399 N.YS.2d 697, 699 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(upholding order granting custody to foster mother over biological mother on
basis of child's attachment to former, supporting the trial court's conclusion that
though biological mother was fit and provided for child's needs, she had not
"begun to respond to Gina Marie's emotional needs," resulting in "an emotional
void.., between mother and daughter").
" 405 U.S. at 658.
51 Once common, such a rule also had the effect of freeing an unmarried
father
from the parental obligations of providing for his children's welfare.
52 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53 (though many unmarried fathers may
be
uninvolved or unfit, Stanley was not, and "the State spites its own articulated
goals when it needlessly separates him from his family"). Conversely, it is
48
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A more contemporary example is that of non-biological gay and
lesbian parents. Many courts and state legislatures have recognized the
parental rights of gay and lesbian persons who function as psychological
parents (often referred to in this context as "de facto" parents), either to
children born to the other partner or to those absorbed into the family
through surrogacy, foster care, and adoption.53 In reaching these
determinations, legal decision-makers have relied heavily on the
emotional attachments such parent figures form with their children. This
is normatively desirable, as to deny those bonds would be to elevate
discriminatory societal attitudes about sexual orientation above the value
of providing for the well-being of children.54 Unfortunately, some states
and courts have taken a different path, dismissing attachment concerns in
favor of discriminatory, status-based determinations. In Lofton 1vSec ',of
Dep 't of Children and Family Services, for instance, the 11 th Circuit
upheld a Florida statute that bars gay and lesbian persons from adopting
children (though not from serving as foster parents). 55 Among the
plaintiffs was a gay couple that had provided long-term foster care for a
number of HIV-positive children. One child, for whom they had cared
for years, was legally freed for adoption and they then sought to adopt
him. While acknowledging the "deeply loving emotional bonds"
between the child and his would-be parents, affirming that parental
influence shapes "their children's psychology, character, and personality
for years to come," and purporting to promote "the best interest of the
child," the court nonetheless upheld the state's weak and discriminatory
rationales for barring the adoption.5 6 The court reached this result in the
perverse to deny all rights to men who have acted as secure attachment figures
and later are discovered not to be the biological parent. See, e.g., Elisa B. v.
Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785
(Sup. Ct. 2004). Attachment theory would counsel a different result. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 42, at § 2.03 (1) (classifying such a person as a "parent
by estoppel").
53 For an overview, see Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a
Democracy." Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 933, 934 (2000).
s4 Those issues have also been raised in determinations
as to whether a gay or
lesbian parent may retain custody of or visitation with his or her biological
children despite a former partner's objection. There are many such cases. See,
e.g., C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004). Proper respect for
attachment counsels the route that some states and courts have taken: rather than
disadvantage the non-biological partner because of sexual orientation, her
claims should be evaluated with the same criteria applicable to any divorce or
separation case involving heterosexual couples in which a significant
attachment relationship with the child has formed.
5'358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-140, § 1,
Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3) (2002)).
56 Lofton, 358 U.S. at 815, 819, 810 (expressing fear that plaintiffs'
position
would create family rights in "any collection of individuals living together and
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face of uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiffs were the only
attachment figures the child had ever known or had any reasonable
prospect of knowing. Florida's law, which fortunately stands alone in the
United States, 57 values condemnation of gay and lesbian persons more
than it values the attachment needs of adoptable children (not to mention
all the other benefits of legally-recognized parenting, such as child
support and inheritance rights). Adequate appreciation
of attachment
58
it.
invalidate
to
Circuit
th
11
the
led
have
would
Attachment theory lends itself to other all-upside applications. In
Smith v. OFFER, for example, the Court correctly recognized the
potentially dispositive nature of attachment where the state seeks not
family reunification but transfer of a child to another foster home. 59 If
the foster parent-child attachment is minimally secure, even if perhaps
more anxious or avoidant than the ideal, the state should have to
articulate a very compelling reason to trade it out for another temporary
placement. Thus, in that case respect for existing attachment rightly was
invoked to halt the harmful practice of shuffling placements.] And while
in post-divorce custody disputes there is no substitute for good
parenting, solid research may indicate which types of arrangements pose
the fewest obstacles to good parenting or create the best buffer against
poor parenting. If one type of arrangement appears clearly to fit that bill,
enjoying strong emotional bonds" and upset the result of Smith v. OFFER).
Perversely, Florida was content to allow the child to remain as a foster
placement, and even offered the would-be parents the option of serving as "legal
guardians," but would not legitimize the parent-child relationship.
57 Unfortunately, some states are now attempting to reach the same result
with
an approach less obviously aimed at gay and lesbian persons: they have chosen
to bar adoption by unmarried cohabitating persons. This category necessarily
includes all cohabitating homosexual couples, who are in those states barred
from marrying and from obtaining recognition for marriages lawfully entered
into elsewhere. See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, No. CV-2008-14284, available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/cole v arkansas complaintv2.pdf
(challenging
"An Act Providing That an Individual Who Is Cohabiting Outside of a Valid
Marriage May Not Adopt or Be a Foster Parent of a Child Less Than Eighteen
Years Old," approved by statewide ballot measure in Nov. 2008).
58 A Florida trial judge recently ruled the adoption ban unconstitutional
for
precisely this reason. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *20 (Fla.
Cir. Ct., Nov. 25, 2008) (noting that a "child in need of love, safety and stability
does not first consider the sexual orientation of his parent.... John and
James ...were removed from an environment perilous to their physical,

emotional and educational well being. Their biological parents relinquished
them to the State, which in turn placed them into an environment that allowed
them, eventually, to heal, and now flourish.").
" Smith, 431 U.S. at 852-53 (distinguishing between interest of, and procedure
due, foster parents when removal sought for placement of child in different
foster home rather than for return to natural parents).
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the law should encourage it. If, as is more likely, different types will
work for different families, the law should facilitate sound choices.
Again, the goal is not optimal attachment; we must be comfortable with
some level of imperfection. But if particular schemes clearly maximize
possibility and minimize harm it would be foolish not to favor them.
One final all-upside legal approach is suggested by Shaver et al.'s
contribution. They note that emotional attachments between former
spouses persist after divorce and that these ongoing attachments underlie

the intense conflict and contradictory push-pull impulses that all too
often characterize post-divorce legal battles.6 ° In addition to the hopeful
psychological interventions they mention,61 changes in family law may
encourage better post-divorce collaboration in support of mutual goals.
Clare Huntington has argued convincingly for recognition of such
ongoing commitments, moving away from a family law system that
"freezes" the relationship at the moment of rupture. 62 While the precise
contours of such a reinvented system are not yet delineated, they likely
would include greater reliance on mediation and collaborative decisionmaking models. There is no reason not to pursue such options, and every
reason to do so.

IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF

SOCIAL-SERVICE PROGRAMMING THAT

REFLECTS ATTACHMENT NEEDS

Finally, it is important to note that not all law-relevant changes need
take the shape of law reform. The social-services aspect of law matters
enormously. To the extent that our existing legal regime can become
more responsive to the psychological needs of those who use and rely
upon it, we all benefit. It is not quite accurate to say that such social
welfare investment has no downside, for it costs money. But in many
instances we are spending money regardless and could simply be
spending it better; in others the downstream benefit more than justifies
the cost.
In their contribution, Shaver et al. outline at least two such
situations. First, pointing to an argued connection between juvenile
delinquency and insecure attachment, they cite a study indicating that
detained juveniles fare better when they are able to form secure
attachment bonds with staff members.63 On this basis, they assert that
"establishing security enhancing relationships should receive top priority
See Shaver et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 17-19).
Id. (manuscript at 19-20).
62 See Clare Huntington, RepairingFamilyLaw, 57 DuKE L.J. 1245 (2008).
63 See Shaver et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 24) (suggesting that attachment
avoidance is associated with juvenile delinquency and describing studies on
juveniles in residential treatment).
60
61
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in rehabilitation programs. 6 4 I agree. We ought to, though, have a
healthy skepticism about the promise of detained adolescents'
attachments to legal authority figures, for such a focus has dangers. It is
reminiscent of the rhetoric invoked in the earliest days of juvenile
justice, when the juvenile judge was imagined to be a "wise and merciful
father., 65 At that time it was presumed that any child committing an
offense was being poorly parented and that bonding with the judge and
probation officer, who would function as (superior) parental stand-ins,
would lead wayward youth back to psychological health and law-abiding
behavior. While the juvenile system shaped by adherence to this model
was infinitely superior to treating children like adult criminals (a state of
affairs to which we are, sadly, fast returning), it led to extreme state
overreaching and interference with the rights of both juveniles and
parents. 66 But so long as we can agree that the state never should haul
young people into its juvenile jurisdiction because of parent/child
attachment problems and that the existence of such problems cannot
justify greater restrictions on the young person than otherwise would be
fair, if a young person nonetheless is subject to state control it is to
everyone's benefit to provide opportunities for secure attachment
formation. Particularly given the appalling conditions present in so many
juvenile facilities today, and the extraordinary neglect and abuse many
juveniles suffer at the hands of staff members, 67 a re-commitment to
actual rehabilitation is in order, and encouraging true mentorship,
emotional support, and guidance from staff would be a most welcome
development.
Second, Shaver et al. point to research detailing the contribution of
insecure attachment patterns to domestic violence. It appears from their
discussion that either an anxious or avoidant attachment pattern can
contribute to domestic violence, as a perpetrator or victim. 68 It is difficult
Id. (manuscript at 25).
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
66 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
67 See Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency Treatment to
Enhance Rehabilitation, PersonalAccountability, and Public Safety, 84 OR. L.
REv. 1001 (2005).
68 Shaver et al., supra note 1 (manuscript at 11-16). I understand
Shaver et al. to
assert that an anxious pattern might create excessive fear of abandonment,
resulting in violence against a partner who seeks to leave or withdraw affection,
see id. (manuscript at 14-15), but possibly also leading to inability to leave an
abusive partner, see id. (manuscript at 16). They also assert that those with
avoidance patterns are more likely (presumably as compared with securely
attached persons) to engage in domestic violence and revenge-seeking behavior,
see id. (manuscript at 12), but that avoidance is also associated with victimhood,
see id. (manuscript at 16). Therefore, I understand the claim to be that any nonsecure pattern can contribute to either perpetration or victimhood, though for
different reasons.
64
65
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to say how such an insight might materially affect domestic violence
laws. From a criminal law perspective, so long as a perpetrator is
minimally sane and voluntarily commits an assaultive act with the
requisite mens rea, he may be punished, regardless of psychodynamic
factors that may have contributed to his actions. Though those factors
could be taken into consideration at sentencing, to do so in cases of
domestic violence-and not other types of crimes-would be met with
swift protest, regarded as a throwback to the bad old days when family
violence was deemed an understandable aspect of heterosexual
relationships. But if we care about prevention and rehabilitation, we
ought to care about identifying the contributors to domestic violence and
investing in programs-both within and outside the criminal justice
system-that can uncover and redirect them. Similarly, if we care about
providing effective victims' services, we should invest in similar
programs for potential and actual victims. Our system often purports to
do just these things; however, our commitment to such programsparticularly for perpetrators-is fickle, often fading at the first hint of
non-negligible short-term budgetary impacts. 69 The research synopsized
by Shaver et al. is a reminder that turning our back on such social
policies comes at a cost.
V. CONCLUSION
From Shaver et al.'s contribution, it is apparent that attachment
patterns, strongly shaped by childhood experiences, are a vital aspect of
the people we become. These patterns may well influence the extent to
which our actions open us to state intervention, as well as the shape such
intervention should take. As this Comment has shown, our law already
seeks to take such considerations into account, and in some instances
respect for attachment may be legally determinative. But as a general
matter, family law is enriched, not determined, by an adequate
appreciation of attachment concerns.
There is much we still do not know. The legal relevance of the
attachment perspective would benefit, for example. from more
information about the plasticity of attachment patterns. If, as Shaver et
al. suggest, many negative patterns are observable at twelve to eighteen
months and tend to persist, but later-in-life treatment programs have
been shown to be successful in altering them, such patterns must be at
least somewhat plastic. 70 How might law best exploit that capacity? Also
relevant would be research on the number of primary attachment
This same point pertains to Shaver et al.'s recommendations regarding
treatment programs for persons incarcerated in prisons and jails, particularly
those with substance abuse disorders. See Shaver et al., supra note I
(manuscript at 24).
70 Shaver et al., supra note I (manuscript at 5, 30).
69
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relationships from which a child can benefit. Is there, for example, any
good reason to continue to limit the number of possible parents to two? 7 I
Our family law, and the social services with which it frequently
comes bundled, undoubtedly will benefit from the answers to such
questions. Though we cannot look to attachment theory for all of our
answers, we can use it to arrive at some.

71

The ALl Principles impose no cap on the number of possible parent figures

(legal parents, parents by estoppel, and defacto parents) a child may have.

